¿Qué pasa con las formas de pensar los terceros, los otros, sin tener que apelar al reconocimiento, la diferencia y la identidad como lógica fundamental del pensamiento inclusivo? Desde luego, como todo orden formal o lógico, problematizar de esta manera el tercero excluido —en el contexto de este comentario preliminar a los artículos que conforman el presente dossier— desea proponer una cierta perspectiva de análisis en torno al pensamiento y el discurso inclusivo. Busca sustraerse a la lógica de la representación, (...) a la mímesis como índice y epígono de la relación entre ser y saber. (shrink)

Habla sobre la mirada, abunda sobre la atención que se presta a lo que nos rodea y sobre la resistencia que lo mirado nos opone.

The contemporary status of images is seductive and at the same time frightening. The images of today have become a space of conflict between truth and the political and aesthetic condition that defines cinema and photography. Author Barrios, curator of contemporary art presents a series of articles and essays focused on the relationship between desire and horror in the contemporary image regime.

In the evolution of criminally relevant action in modern crime theory, social action has assumed a particular significance as a dogmatic element that enables the effective protection of legal assets in a society beset by risks. In the vast array of theories regarding the role of the guarantor and its legal and doctrinal development, as well as the jurisprudential extension of equivalence clauses of improper omissions that serve as amplifier devices of the criminal statue through an indirect adaptation, there is (...) a need to identify the most effective means to shield legal assets, which allows for an imputation of passive conducts, despite having an active typical description. This introduces the controversial figure of the improper omission, which is used with the function of perfecting all of the structural elements of the criminal conduct. When an individual knows he is in a position of guarantor and is aware of the potential consequences, but fails to take action, having the means to prevent a foreseeable outcome, this device serves to enhance the criminal protection of legal assets, fostering social solidarity as the basis of the criminal justice system. This system, by satisfying the function of general prevention of the punishment, ideally dissuades the individual from committing crimes with the threat of penalty. These theories are fundamental to understanding criminal responsibility by improper omission in the context of the objective imputation theory. By guiding the evolution and delimitation of its application, they serve as a significant factor in criminal social control in Colombia. (shrink)

Reflection about the contemporary validity of political descriptive studies, developed and spread by political scientists and, specially, by anglo-american political theorists (huntington). considering giovanni sartori as the more important diffuser of these theories in continental europe, the methodology and the practical proposals of his famous essay the theory of democracy are contrasted, on the one hand, with the main critiques that adorno levelled at descriptivism and, on the other hand, with the arguments that reality itself puts up against its putative (...) description. (shrink)

Interest in republicanism as a political theory has burgeoned in recent years, but its implications for the understanding of law have remained largely unexplored. Legal Republicanism is the first book to offer a comprehensive, critical survey of the potential for creating republican accounts of fundamental issues in law and legal theory.

_Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings _is a comprehensive anthology that includes classic and contemporary readings from leading philosophers. Addressing in depth the major topics within philosophy of psychology, the editor has carefully selected articles under the following headings: pictures of the mind commonsense psychology representation and cognitive architecture. Articles by the following philosophers are included: Blackburn, Churchland, Clark, Cummins, Dennett, Davidson, Fodor, Kitcher, Lewis, Lycan, McDowell, McLeod, Rey, Segal, Stich. Each section includes a helpful introduction by the editor which aims (...) to guide the student gently into the topic. The book is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject, including discussion of the leading philosophers in the field. Ideal for any student of philosophy of psychology or philosophy of mind. (shrink)

El presente trabajo constituye un estudio comparativo y narratológico entre la autoficción Le lit (1960) de Dominique Rolin y la adaptación cinematográfica realizada por Marion Hänsel (1982). Partiendo de un análisis estructural de los textos literario y fílmico, respectivamente iluminados por las corrientes estéticas a las que pertenecen, se establecerá la especificidad de cada discurso. Ello permitirá considerar la naturaleza de las transformaciones que la directora realiza en el guión en el proceso de transmodalización.

La Salud Mental se mueve en un territorio con límites imprecisos: la consideración de un comportamiento como sano o enfermo depende del momento histórico, de la sociedad y la cultura en la que se produce o, sencillamente, de la ideología del profesional que califica ese comportamiento. Desde la perspectiva del Constructivismo Radical se exploran estos límites entre la locura y la cordura y se cuestionan los criterios de clasificación al uso en los Servicios de Salud Mental a través de una (...) serie de ejemplos, que ponen de relieve la inestabilidad de estos y la oscuridad de los mismos. La idea que atraviesa este debate es que la autonomía de los pacientes cobra protagonismo, precisamente, en la relatividad del diagnóstico en Salud Mental, ya que, aunque “locos”, tienen igual derecho que los cuerdos a decidir sobre su propia existencia y su propio estilo de vivir. (shrink)

La crisis multidimensional por la que atraviesa actualmente la humanidad coloca en primer plano la cuestión, más que de «la salida de la crisis», de la superación de los condicionamientos negativos que han conducido a ella. Más allá de las causas próximas reconocibles se hallan las apuestas paradigmáticas, la Weltanschauung dominante que inspira las conductas erróneas. En el artículo se sostiene que a la metafísica materialista —que el autor distingue del ateísmo—, en tanto que idea-guía principal de la modernidad, corresponde (...) gran parte de la responsabilidad por las patologías de la sociedad actual, a cuyo clímax estamos asistiendo. Se asume que el mundo ha experimentado tales transformaciones que ninguna de las concepciones metafísicas o criptometafísicas a las que estamos acostumbrados sirve para fundamentar una guía de actuación capaz de sacarnos del atolladero. Y se propone una idea de fondo que se estima que sí podría hacerlo: un noocentrismo, la consideración de la consciencia como la realidad fundamental y, por supuesto, referencial. Un neoespiritualismo, si se quiere, capaz de fundamentar una Ética universal, y orientado a la liberación individual y colectiva del ser humano, en armonía con una Naturaleza entendida como de igual importancia, y dejando atrás el espejismo pseudocientífico —y en realidad sojuzgador y bloqueante— del materialismo metafísico. (shrink)

The study of human behaviour, and the minds that produce that behaviour, has been an occupation of scholars, artists, and philosophers for millennia. But it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that psychology came into its own as a distinct field of study—and, more importantly, as a scientifically legitimate field of study. When we view psychology as a science, certain questions naturally emerge: what sorts of phenomena does psychology seek to explain? What is distinctive about the kinds (...) of explanations adduced in this science? How do these explanations integrate with theories and explanations in other fields of study? Does psychology aim to explain all mental phenomena, or are there some areas, such as consciousness, that will be forever beyond its explanatory powers? Due to its very nature, psychology is a field that both philosophers and scientists have critically examined over the years. This critical examination has, in turn, generated a literature that is voluminous, heavily contested, and increasingly technical. To help users to make sense of this large and complex scholarly corpus, this new four-volume collection from Routledge is both comprehensive and sensitive to the ongoing nature of debates in the field. Two expert editors have carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create an indispensable ‘mini library’ of the best and most influential scholarship in the philosophy of psychology. With a comprehensive index and newly written introductions by the editors, The Philosophy of Psychology will be welcomed by a broad range of scholars, researchers, and advanced students, especially those working in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. (shrink)

The quantization of the magnetic flux in superconducting rings is studied in the frame of a topological model of electromagnetism that gives a topological formulation of electric charge quantization. It turns out that the model also embodies a topological mechanism for the quantization of the magnetic flux with the same relation between the fundamental units of magnetic charge and flux as there is between the Dirac monopole and the fluxoid.

Updated digital transcription of Spanish translation of the paper by Henry Reeve “The Autobiography of John Stuart Mill”, Edinburgh Review, 134, pp. 91-129, originally published at Revista Europea in 1874.

Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.

How precisely to understand and evaluate counterfactuals can be an intricate issue. The aim of this article is to examine a new set of difficulties for evaluating counterfactuals that arise in the context of the dynamical spacetimes described by the theory of general relativity (GR). The initial value formulation provides us with a methodology to pin down the specific combination of features of the theory at the origin of the difficulties, namely, non-linearity and certain non-local aspects (typically captured by ellipticity (...) at the analytical level), in particular when combined with the global and/or quasi-local character of physical quantities in GR. Finally, we connect the philosophical question about counterfactuals with concrete applied physical issues in GR about extracting meaningful predictions by constructing appropriate initial data sets, leading us to question the very suitability of the Cauchy approach to fully account for the explanatory power of the theory. (shrink)

The architecture of brain, consciousness, and behavioral processes is shown to be formally similar in that all three may be conceived and depicted as Petri net patterned processes structured by a series of elements occurring or becoming active in stochastic succession, in parallel, with different rhythms of temporal iteration, and with a distinct qualitative manifestation in the spatiotemporal domain. A patterned process theory is derived from the isomorphic features of the models and contrasted with connectionist, dynamic system notions. This empirically (...) derived formulation is considered to be optimally compatible with the dual aspect theory in that the foundation of the diverse aspects would be a highly structured and dynamic process, the psychophysical neutral “ground” of mind and matter posed (but not properly determined) by dual aspect and neutral monist theories. It is methodologically sound to approach each one of these processes with specific tools and to establish concurrences in real time between them at the organismic level of analysis. Such intra‐level and inter‐perspective correlations could eventually constitute psychophysical bridge‐laws. A mature psychology of consciousness is necessary to situate and verify the bridges required by a genuine mind‐body science. (shrink)

"The book presents in accessible fashion recent important work on the self and self-consciousness and also moves the issues forward with interesting new ideas. It provides a notably crisp and clear treatment of some extremely intriguing topics." -- Jane Heal, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge In this book, José Luis Bermú dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in (...) terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Bermú dez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox ofself-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of (more or less similar versions of) folk psychology. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by Thomas (...) Baldwin 7 At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a justification for transcendental idealism that emerges from the dialogue with philosophical scepticism in which Kant is on and off engaged throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. Many commentators, most prominently Strawson, have claimed that transcend‐ ental idealism is an unfortunate addition to the Critique, one that can profitably be excised in the interests of clarity and coherence. Against this general picture I urge that transcendental idealism is in fact a very natural consequence of some (...) of the central doctrines of the Critical Philosophy. It is in the context of Kant's debate with scepticism that this emerges most clearly. Nonetheless, I argue that Kant's employment of transcendental idealism against the sceptic is seriously compromised by his postulating the existence of unknowable things‐in‐themselves. As long as he maintains that there are unknowable things‐in‐themselves which are responsible for our having the experience that we do have, his position seems to collapse into sceptical idealism. In the final section of the paper I suggest that the only possible escape from this difficulty would be to rule out the possibility of affirming that unknowable things‐in‐themselves exist. I also suggest that an argument to this effect exists in the Critique and that Kant's position would be more consistent had he adhered to it. (shrink)

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

Debates about bodily ownership and psychological ownership have typically proceeded independently of each other. This paper explores the relation between them, with particular reference to how each is illuminated by psychopathology. I propose a general framework for studying ownership that is applicable both to bodily ownership and psychological ownership. The framework proposes studying ownership by starting with explicit judgments of ownership and then exploring the bases for those judgments. Section 3 discusses John Campbell’s account of ψ-ownership in the light of (...) that general framework, emphasizing in particular his fractionation of ψ-ownership into two dissociable components. Section 4 briefly presents an account of φ-ownership that I have developed in more detail elsewhere. Section 5 explores the suggestion, originating with Alexandre Billon, that there needs to be an integrated account of φ-ownership and ψ-ownership because depersonalization disorders typically involve breakdowns of both φ-ownership and ψ-ownership. The argument from depersonalization is not compelling, but Section 6 proposes a different way of reaching the same conclusion. Section 7 shows how reflecting on agency and practical reasoning offers a common thread between the models of φ-ownership and ψ-ownership discussed earlier in the paper. (shrink)

In Thinking without Words I develop a philosophical framework for treating some animals and human infants as genuine thinkers. This paper outlines the aspects of this account that are most relevant to those working in animal ethics. There is a range of different levels of cognitive sophistication in different animal species, in addition to limits to the types of thought available to non-linguistic creatures, and it may be important for animal ethicists to take this into account in exploring issues of (...) moral significance and the obligations that we might or might not have to non-human animals. (shrink)

The author challenges the view that birth cannot be a morally relevant fact in the process of development from zygote to child. He reviews specific arguments against giving any moral significance to the fact of birth. Drawing on recent work in developmental psychology, he contends that the lives of neonates can have a level of self-consciousness that confers moral significance but can only be possessed after birth. He shows that the position he has argued for provides a framework within which (...) the move from the moral validity of aborting sentient fetuses to the moral validity of infanticide might be resisted. He concludes that arguments suggesting that birth can be morally significant support the view that the acquisition of moral significance is a gradual and multilayered phenomenon. (shrink)

Reseña de la obra de Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Humanismo Republicano Iberoamericano. Un debate. Ambrosio Velasco Gómez; José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2019, pp. 127.

Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.

Con la finalidad de contribuir a los estudios de recepción de la obra de Søren Kierkegaard en México, este artículo presenta un análisis de su presencia en la obra escrita de Alfonso Reyes y Juan José Arreola. Para ello se abordan de manera sucinta los parámetros de recepción mundial y nacional del danés, para proseguir con el análisis puntual de las menciones explícitas de Reyes y Arreola, con esto se brindan herramientas de comprensión de Kierkegaard en la obra de (...) los mexicanos y se atiende a subsanar un faltante en los estudios de recepción kierkegaardiana allende el ámbito filosófico académico. (shrink)

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.